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ENOUGH IS ENOUGH:
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
OF SPORT AGENTS
JAMES MASTERALEXIS1, LISA MASTERALEXIS2, AND KEVIN SNYDER3
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional athletes rely on sports agents to represent them in
the business aspects of their profession.  Agents play a critical role
in the athletes’ lives by managing business affairs off the field, so
that the athletes can focus on their performance on the field.4
Most professional athletes rely on agents as trusted advisors for
many off-the-field aspects of their careers: to negotiate contracts,
engage in marketing activities, develop athletes’ brands, secure
their financial futures, and prepare them for life after their playing
careers.  In playing such a key role in the athlete’s life, great trust is
put in the agent.  Violation of that trust by the agent, which results
in eliminating an athlete’s athletic eligibility, ruining an athlete’s
financial future, harming a collegiate athletic program, and inter-
fering with professional contracts should be addressed by Congress.
Among the first sports agents were theater promoter C.C.
(“Cash and Carry”) Pyle, who in 1925 negotiated a deal with the
Chicago Bears for Red Grange to earn $3,000 per game and an
additional $300,000 in movie rights, and sports cartoonist Christy
Walsh, who provided Babe Ruth with financial advice during the
Great Depression.5  In 1960, Mark H. McCormack’s historic hand-
1. Assistant Professor of Sport Management and Sport Law, Western New En-
gland University. J. D. Suffolk University Law School, Boston, MA. B.A University
of New Hampshire, Durham, NH.
2. Department Head and Associate Professor, Mark H. McCormack Depart-
ment of Sport Management, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massa-
chusetts. J.D. Suffolk University School of Law, Boston, MA, B.S., Sport
Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
3. Assistant Professor of Sport Management, Southern New Hampshire Uni-
versity. Ph.D. Candidate, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA; MBA, Univer-
sity of Oregon, Eugene, OR; B.S. Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.
4. See Diane Brady, Online Extra: Arnold Palmer: With IMG From the Start, BLOOM-
BERG BUS. WEEK MAGAZINE (July 11, 2004), http://www.businessweek.com/maga-
zine/content/04_28/b3891131.htm (detailing Palmer’s relationship with his
agent).  The article further looks at the development of the creation of the sports
agent world, from Arnold Palmer’s perspective. See id. (providing how Palmer’s
agent changed his perspective on sports marketing).
5. See R.C. BERRY, W.B. GOULD, & P.D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS, 10 (1986) (recounting history of early sports agents such as C.C.
(69)
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shake deal with Arnold Palmer launched the full service sports
agency business.6  Athletes increasingly relied on sports agents in
the late 1960s and the 1970s as professional sports grew exponen-
tially.7  The emergence of new leagues competing for talent with
the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL, the development of a free agent
market in baseball as a result of the Messersmith-McNally arbitra-
tion decision, increased media revenues in professional sports, and
growth in endorsement opportunities all created a need for athletes
to be represented by agents in contract negotiations.8
The growth, however, produced an oversupply of agents for a
finite number of clients.  Currently, there are 4,300 professional
athletes in the four major leagues in United States and between
1,600 and 1,800 agents certified by their respective players associa-
tions.9  While the field can provide high reward and stature, it is
also full of risk, creating an environment fraught with ethical chal-
lenges.  Due to the heavy competition for clients, agents often act in
an overly aggressive manner when recruiting and retaining clients.
In fact, it appears that offering inducements to athletes in an effort
to sign them to representation agreements is routine in the busi-
ness.10  Despite a maze of regulations and laws promulgated over
Pyle, who helped jumpstart sports agency and marketing); see also Craig Neff, Den
of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 19, 1987), http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1066585/index.htm (ex-
plaining Ruth’s benefit from Walsh’s assistance).
6. See Brady, supra note 4 (“Palmer attributes much of his financial success to R
his long relationship with IMG founder Mark McCormack, who launched the
sports-management company to service the young golf star back in 1960.”).
7. See KENNETH SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
AGENTS, 9-14 (2003) (providing how, as professional sports leagues began to grow
in popularity, athletes in these leagues began to rely more and more on agents).
8. See Nat’l & Am. League Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Play-
ers Ass’n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976); see also Kan. City Royals v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 261 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d, 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding “the provisions of Major League Rules 4—A(a)
and 3(g) do not inhibit, prohibit or prevent such clubs from negotiating or deal-
ing with respect to employment with the grievants [in this case]”; also, that “Mes-
sersmith shall have been  removed from the reserve list of the Los Angeles Club
and after grievant McNally shall have been removed from the reserve or disquali-
fied lists of the Montreal Club . . . .”). See LISA P. MASTERALEXIS, CAROL A. BARR &
MARY HUMS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SPORTS MANAGEMENT (4th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (providing that with growth of professional sporting
leagues and increased media deals and endorsement opportunities that came
along with it, athletes began to turn more to agents).
9. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 252 (listing four major leagues in United R
States: Major League Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), National
Hockey League (NHL), and National Basketball Association (NBA)).
10. See Phillip J. Closius, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fan Scorned: State Regulation of
Sports Agents, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 512 (1999) (looking at “uncontrolled” activity
of agents and reality of payments to collegiate athletes).
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the past thirty years, improper behavior by agents persists.  Recent
examples of this improper behavior include:
- Cecil Newton, father of Carolina Panther quarterback
Cam Newton who played college football at Auburn, alleg-
edly tried to sell his son’s college playing services to Missis-
sippi State for $180,000 while Cam was being recruited out
of ju- The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) suspended fourteen football players for part of
a season, and eight for the entire season, from the Univer-
sity of North Carolina’s team for receiving improper bene-
fits from an agent and academic misconduct.11
- Marcell Dareus, a defensive tackle on the University of
Alabama’s football team, was suspended for two games by
the NCAA for “accepting nearly $2,000 in improper bene-
fits from an agent.”12
- The NCAA suspended A.J. Green, a University of Georgia
receiver, for four games for selling a football jersey for
$1,000 to an agent.13
nior college.  The NCAA ruled that Cecil Newton did at-
tempt to sell his son’s services but that Cam did not know
about the scheme and, thus, there were no suspensions.14
- On June 7, 2011, the University of Southern California
(“USC”) was stripped of its 2004 National Football Cham-
pionship by the Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”) be-
cause the NCAA had previously determined that former
USC star Reggie Bush had received extra benefits from a
would-be sports marketer in violation of NCAA rules.  The
NCAA also penalized USC by imposing a two-year ban
from postseason play and the loss of 30 scholarships.15
Bush’s Heisman win was vacated and both Bush and USC
were forced to return their copies of the trophies.
- Nevin Shapiro, former booster and co-owner of a sports
agency firm, who is incarcerated for his involvement in a
11. See A Look at Recent College Football Scandals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 31,
2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2011-05-31-
4176652001_x.htm (listing most recent scandals plaguing college football).
12. See id. (stating example of college athlete and agent impropriety).
13. See id. (stating example of college athlete and agent impropriety).
14. See id. (stating example of college athlete and agent impropriety).
15. See Ted Miller, USC Stripped of ‘04 Championship, ESPN (June 7, 2011, 10:35
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=6632190 (“One
of the best ways of ensuring that [BCS games] remain [showcase events] is for us to
foster full compliance with NCAA rules.  Accordingly, in keeping with the NCAA’s
recent action, USC’s appearances are being vacated.”).
3
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$930 million Ponzi scheme, claims to have given Univer-
sity of Miami athletes hundreds of thousands of dollars in
cash, prostitutes, and entertainment at his homes and
yachts.  The allegations are currently under investigation
by the NCAA.16
- In 2010 amid allegations that the Toronto Blue Jays were
negotiating with the agent of James Paxton, a University of
Kentucky junior and MLB first round draft pick, the Uni-
versity declared Paxton ineligible for his senior season.
That led to Paxton suing the school, “charging that ath-
letic officials threatened to bar him from playing if he did
not agree to meet with NCAA investigators, even though
he was not told what rules he was accused of violating.”17
A Kentucky judge ruled in the University’s favor.18
The conduct of some sports agents has the potential to shake
the confidence that the American people have in collegiate athlet-
ics at major universities.  The illegal and unethical actions of agents
may cause private and public universities to lose the services of their
teams, athletes, and coaches due to improper behavior that draws
suspensions from the NCAA.  The effect of the improper agent ac-
tivity extends beyond those declared ineligible by the NCAA to
teammates, coaches, administrators, the campus at large, alumni,
and fans who are also victims of the penalties.  Large public univer-
sities often invest significant public funds into athletic programs
16. See Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Bene-
fits to Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug.16, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/investiga-
tions/news?slug=CR-renegade_miami_booster_details_illicit_benefits_081611
(revealing Shapiro ran eight years of NCAA rule-breaking, totaling millions of dol-
lars, sometimes with the knowledge of at least seven football and basketball
coaches); see also Pete Thamel, Hurricane Players and Recruits Accused of NCAA Viola-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/17/sports/ncaafootball/miami-hurricanes-accused-of-ncaa-violations.
html (reporting allegations involving at least seventy-two current and past players).
17. See Devon Teeple, James Paxton: After a Controversial Career at UK, Paxton
Back on Baseball Grid, BLEACHER REPORT (May 9, 2011), http://bleacherreport.
com/articles/694732-after-a-controversial-career-at-uk-james-paxton-is-back-on-the-
baseball-grid (explaining that according to NCAA, Paxton violated NCAA rules by
having agent Scott Boras act on his behalf).  It has not been reported whether
Boras had a contract with Paxton in compliance with UAAA and SPARTA regula-
tions. See id.
18. See Judge: Kentucky Can Keep Paxton Out of Games, USA TODAY (Jan. 16,
2010, 12:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/baseball/2010-01-16-
kentucky-paxton_N.htm (ruling Kentucky could bench Paxton for refusing to an-
swer NCAA questions about possible illegal actions threatening his amateur
status).
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and stadia.19  Coaches at these universities are often the highest
paid state employees.20
Congress should re-examine the involvement of agents with
student-athletes, as it appears that legislation to date has been inef-
fective.  A recent study by the United States Anti-Doping Agency
found that “[n]early 90% of U.S. adults agree that well-known ath-
letes have a responsibility to be positive role models . . . .”21  Fur-
ther, the same study found that forty-one percent of children in the
general population who play sports and twenty-nine percent of chil-
dren involved in organized sports through a national governing
body agree that if a well-known athlete breaks the rules, it makes
children think it is acceptable to break the rules in order to win.22
Thus, it is important to ensure that the actions of agents potentially
inducing amateur athletes to violate NCAA rules do not have an
adverse effect on professional and college sports, which in turn er-
odes the confidence that young athletes have in their role models.23
These are the problems that the Sports Agent Responsibility and
19. See Kelly Lyell, Stadium Hopes: The University of Minnesota’s Story and How
Three Others Are Going About It, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:35
AM), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20120221/NEWS01/120221003/Sta-
dium-hopes-University-Minnesota-s-story-how-three-others-going-about-it?nclick_
check=1 (explaining that University of Minnesota recently moved into TCF Bank
Stadium, which cost $288 million to construct).  Minnesota’s state legislature ap-
proved public financing to fund about half of the $288 million construction cost,
with the rest coming from TCF Bank’s $35 million naming rights, a student fee of
$25 a year and increased parking revenue from campus lots on game days. See id.
20. See Jeff Smith, Jim Calhoun Highest Paid State Employee In 2009, Followed By
Geno Aruiemma, Randy Edsall, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.) (May 25, 2010, 12:56
PM), http://blogs.courant.com/uconn_mens_basketball/2010/05/calhoun-high-
est-paid-state-emp.html (identifying three highest paid state employees in Connect-
icut: Jim Calhoun, University of Connecticut’s Basketball Coach (2008 salary
$1,618,655.44), Randy Edsall, former University of Connecticut football coach
(2008 salary $1,380,569.00) and Geno Auriemma, University of Connecticut wo-
man’s basketball coach (2008 salary $1,309,426.44)).
21. See What Sport Means in America: A Survey of Sport’s Role in Society, 7 U.S.
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 1010, July 7, 2012, http://www.usantidoping.org/uploads/
usadaresearchreport.pdf (reporting results from study “of nearly 9,000 Americans,
representing the general population, coaches, athletes, and parents of athletes in-
volved in Olympic-path sports and non-Olympic level sports (e.g. community-
based, school-based, informal).”).
22. See id. at 9 (“As children move into the teen years, their rankings of posi-
tive influencers shift away from direct influencers such as coaches, parents, and
teachers, toward indirect influencers such as Olympic and college athletes, demon-
strating a swing in focus to external public personalities as role models.”).
23. See Tracy L. Ziemer, Study Says Kids Emulate Athletes, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13,
2000), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id=100296#.TxCXxaUeMwE (report-
ing study by Kaiser Family Foundation children learn lessons about sports and life
from watching famous athletes).  The study found that “[t]hree-fourths of the
1,500 10- to 17-year-olds and 1,950 parents surveyed said athletes teach children
that being a good sport and playing fair are as important as winning.” Id.
5
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Trust Act (SPARTA) and the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA)
were enacted to address.24  It is clear that neither statute has effec-
tively rid athletics of these problems because they are rarely
enforced.25
There have been many groups engaged in attempting to regu-
late agents.  Among them are players associations, universities, ath-
letic conferences, national governing bodies, the NCAA, state and
federal governments, a now-defunct professional association called
the Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes (ARPA),
and a new association, the National Association of Sports Agents &
Athlete Representatives (NASAAR).26  Despite the introduction of
regulations by all of these groups, none have been truly effective at
addressing the full range of problems that have occurred since the
late 1970s when former sportswriter Richard Sorkin, agent to doz-
ens of NHL and NBA players, squandered an estimated $1.2 million
of his clients’ money, much of it on his own gambling and poor
investments.27  Beyond unscrupulous agents’ improper conduct in
collegiate sports, reports of unethical behavior in the field of sports
agency are widespread.  The intended beneficiaries of the sports
agency business, professional athletes, are often victims of their
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7807 (2006) (regulating contact between student
athletes and athlete agents). See generally FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agent Act, NCAA
(July 29, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Re-
sources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/July+latest+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+
Athlete+Agents+Act (enacted to regulate athlete agents’ behavior).  “[T]he UAAA,
as enacted, requires an athlete agent to register with a state authority, typically the
Secretary of State, in order to act as an athlete agent in that state.  During the
registration process, an athlete agent must provide important background infor-
mation, both professional and criminal in nature.  As of July 2010, the UAAA has
been passed in 40 states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  This
includes Illinois, which will take effect Jan. 1, 2011.  Three more states have non-
UAAA laws in place designed to regulate agents.” Id.
25. See Alan Scher Zagier, Laws on Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 17, 2010, 4:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/
laws-on-sports-agents-rar_n_685000.html (“[A]n Associated Press review has found
that more than half of the 42 states with sports agent laws [e.g. the UAAA] have yet
to revoke or suspend a single license, or invoke penalties of any sort.”).
26. See Darren Heitner, National Association of Sports Agents & Athlete Representa-
tives, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (May 7, 2012), http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2012/
05/07/national-association-of-sports-agents-athlete-representatives/ (creating pro-
gram geared towards representing interests of sports agents and others represent-
ing athletes).  “The hope is that NASAAR will at least, in part, help remove the oft
unjustified target on sports agents.” Id.
27. See Neff, supra note 5, at 2 (providing story of financial “skulduggery” of R
agents).  “But as court suits pitting athletes against agents proliferate, the Sorkin
scandal no longer seems so shocking.” Id.
6
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trusted advisors.28  Problems that occur with some frequency in-
clude incompetent representation, improper financial advising,
fraud, larceny, conflicts of interest, charging excessive fees, and
raiding clients.29
In one of the most infamous cases, former agent, Tank Black,
violated his fiduciary responsibility to his players, pled guilty to
money laundering and obstruction of justice charges, and lost a
criminal trial on charges of stock fraud.  He served a seven year
prison sentence.30  Between 1999 and 2002, according to the Na-
tional Football League Players Association (NFLPA) estimates, sev-
enty-eight players lost a total of forty-two million dollars from
fraudulent financial advisors, some of whom were also their
agents.31  In response, in 2002 the NFLPA commenced its Financial
Advisors Program, but critics say “the union’s vetting process for the
more than 400 approved money managers isn’t strenuous
enough.”32  In all fairness, the NFLPA’s mission is to be the exclu-
sive bargaining agent for the players, not a regulator of financial
advisors.  Additionally, if the NFLPA were to have a more strenuous
vetting process, it could lead to an antitrust action against the
NFLPA since regulating financial advising lies outside of the
union’s labor exemption to such lawsuits.33
28. See id. (“At the root of many athletes’ financial woes is the fact that agents
are subject to few educational or professional requirements, only the vaguest ethi-
cal standards and a bare minimum of regulation.”).
29. See id. (explaining one instance of fraud where football players were taken
in by Dallas agent Joe Courrege and his devout Christianity).  Further examples
include: Steve Kemp trade to the Chicago White Sox because the club despised
dealing with his agent, players receiving kickbacks to take lower signing bonuses,
negotiating short term contract purely for tax reasons instead of athlete ability,
conflict of interests between agents running tournaments while representing play-
ers in such tournaments. See id.
30. See L. Jon Wertheim, Web of Deceit Smooth-Talking Agent Tank Black Allegedly
Ensnared Nearly Two Dozen NFL and NBA Players, Including Vince Carter, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (May 29, 2000), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/
MAG1019341/index.htm (discussing length of Black’s prison sentence); see also
Litigation Release No. 16455, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (February 25, 2000), http://
classaction.findlaw.com/cases/securities /sec/sec1/files /2000/lr16455.html
(summarizing asset-freeze obtained by SEC against Black); see also Tank Black Jailed
6+ Years, CBCSPORTS (June 14, 2001, 8:22 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/
2001/06/14/black010614.html (summarizing sentence imposed on Black for
money-laundering).
31. See Elena Bergeron, Zero-Sum Game, ESPN MAGAZINE (Aug. 25, 2011, 3:53
PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6895017/nfl-michael-vick-typifies-how-
easily-nfl-players-go-bankrupt-espn-magazine (illustrating how poor financial man-
agement bankrupts professional athletes by example of Michael Vick).
32. Id.
33. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 101-03.  For a further discussion regarding R
the inability of the NFLPA to regulate financial advisors, see infra notes 63 and 64 R
and accompanying text.
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Professional sport unions, major college football and basket-
ball programs, and the NCAA waste valuable time policing agents to
prevent scandals and problems associated with the conduct of
agents.34  In addition, conflicts of interest abound, making policing
difficult.  For instance, the NCAA requires universities to self-moni-
tor.  Athletic departments hire compliance officers to inform staff
about the rules and to enforce those rules.  A compliance officer
may hesitate to report a player’s contact with an agent when it
might trigger NCAA sanctions, or call into question the recruiting
practices of a head coach who may be the highest paid employee in
the university system.35  Likewise, players associations might be
leery to investigate and discipline their union’s most powerful
agents due to the agents’ relationships with a stable of clients who
are also union members.36
The manner in which Congress responded to another systemic
problem in the accounting profession is instructive to the current
situation of unethical sport agents.  In 2001, Enron, a Texas-based
energy company, filed for bankruptcy.  The Enron bankruptcy led
to a scandal because it was later revealed that Enron had fraudu-
lently under-reported company debt and pressured its accounting
firm, Arthur Andersen, to ignore it.  This under-reporting of debt
led to an inflated stock price and company valuation.  As a result,
Arthur Anderson was convicted of criminal obstruction of justice,
although the conviction was later overturned by the United States
Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States.37  Enron’s
fraud and Arthur Anderson’s willingness to ignore its fiduciary re-
sponsibility demonstrated problems in the American stock market
34. See Darren A. Heitner, In Baseball’s Best Interest?: A Discussion of the October
2010 MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 249
(2011).  The Major League Baseball Players Association issued sweeping new agent
regulations principally aimed at addressing client stealing by agents. See Mary
Pilon, Scandals Test the NCAA’s Top Rules Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 16, 2011, at D1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/sports/major-scandals-test-ncaa-
enforcement-arm.html (outlining major college sports scandals of 2011).
35. See generally New Filing Cites Evidence OSU AD Smith, Pres. Gee and Tressell
Concealed Violations from NCAA, BREW ON SOUTH U’S BLOG (Feb. 28, 2012), http://
brewonsouthu.wordpress.com/2012/02/28/new-filing-cites-evidence-osu-ad-smith-
pres-gee-and-tressell-concealed-violations-from-ncaa/ (listing and explaining
OSU’s violations of NCAA rules).  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. R
36. See Michael S. Schmidt, Selig Is Said to Be Unsatisfied With Union’s Stance on
Boras, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/05/sports/baseball/05boras.html (investigating MLB agent’s cash loan to pro-
spective client and MLB players’ union’s claim that this did not violate MLB
regulations).
37. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (overturn-
ing obstruction of justice conviction).
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that were “broad, deep, systemic, and structural.”38  According to
United States Senator Paul Sarbanes, “[a] number of very major,
highly-regarded public companies, along with their auditors, were
relying upon convoluted and often fraudulent accounting devices
to inflate earnings, hide losses, and drive up stock prices.”39
Congress responded to the Enron scandal, and other corpo-
rate and financial scandals, by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, intended to protect publicly traded companies, shareholders,
and the general public from accounting errors and fraudulent prac-
tices.40  With the passage of this Act, Senator Sarbanes commented
that it “set standards for honest, transparent, and ethical business
practices in our great public companies and established the safety
mechanisms to keep them in place.”41
For the reasons that follow, a Congressional response akin to
Sarbanes-Oxley is necessary to restore and preserve the confidence
of the American people in professional and major college football
and basketball institutions.  Specifically, a portion of Sarbanes-
Oxley, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
should be used as a guide to create a board to regulate the conduct
of agents.  Congress has the authority to act because the commer-
cial activities of major college sports constitute interstate com-
merce.42  Further, spectator sports are significant to American
culture and the American economy.  The United States govern-
ment addressed the relationship of sports to American society when
it acknowledged on a State Department website: “Sports play an im-
portant role in American society.  They enjoy tremendous popular-
38. See Nance Lucas, An Interview with United States Senator Paul S. Sarbanes,
11 J. Leadership & Org. Studies 3-8 (2004), available at http://jlo.sagepub.com/content/
11/1/3.full.pdf+html (interviewing Senator Sarbanes about his role as co-author of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
39. Id. at 4 (quoting Senator Sarbanes regarding fraudulent and misleading
tactics used by public companies and their auditors to mislead markets).
40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, July 30, 2002, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf (regulating public company boards,
management, and accounting firms). See generally John C. Coates IV, The Goals and
Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21:1 JOURNAL OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 91-116 (Win-
ter 2007) (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley’s effects on American financial services
industry).
41. Lucas, supra note 38, at 4. R
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . .
[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”).
The commercial activities of major college sports have been determined to be in-
terstate commerce and subject to antitrust legislation. See Law v. NCAA, 902 F.
Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995) (restricting coaches’ earnings violated antitrust laws);
see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1982) (ruling
that NCAA limitations on college football television contracts violate antitrust
laws).
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ity but more important they are vehicles for transmitting such
values as justice, fair play, and teamwork.  Sports have contributed
to racial and social integration and over history have been ‘social
glue’ bonding the country together.”43  Professional sports in the
United States accounts for $32 billion in revenues, with sports
spending growing 1.9 times faster than the gross domestic prod-
uct.44  Evidence exists that the continuing recovery of the United
States economy will continue to have positive effects on profes-
sional sports revenues.  In fact, during the past five years, personal
consumption expenditures on spectator sports grew two percentage
points faster than the personal consumption expenditures in the
United States economy.45
Part II of this article discusses sport agencies as professional
service firms.46  Part III gives background on self-regulation and co-
regulation in professional service firms.47  Part IV discusses prior
attempts at regulating of sport agents.48  Part V describes the pro-
posed Sport Agent Accountability Board (SPAAB), and Part VI con-
cludes with a discussion of the benefits of this new board.49
43. See Sports in America, U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO GERMANY, http://usa.
usembassy.de/sports.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (disseminating information on
sports in America).
44. See Patrice Zygband & Herve Collignon, The Sports Market: Major Trends
and Challenges in an Industry Full of Passion, A.T. KEARNEY (May 2011), http://
www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/the-sports-market.html (offering in-
dependent analysis of global sports markets and concluding that sports industry’s
growth is faster than that of national gross domestic products in many countries).
45. See Catherine Rampell, Growth Accelerates, But U.S. Has Lots of Ground to
Make Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/28/business/economy/us-economy-grows-at-modest-2-8-percent-
rate.html (reporting Commerce Department finding that United States economy
“grew at an annualized rate of 2.8 percent in the fourth quarter [of 2011]”). See
The U.S. Professional Sports Market and Franchise Value Report 2011, WR HAMBRECHT
AND CO. SPORTS FIN. GRP. (2011), http://www.wrhambrecht.com/pdf/2011_
Sports_Market_Report_UPDATE.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (“Personal con-
sumption expenditures [PCE], which represent over two thirds of GDP as a whole,
rose in absolute terms over each of the past five years and at a 3.1% CAGR during
the period, to $10.5 trillion in total according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Spectator sports’ share of PCE grew even faster, at a 5.1% CAGR to over $22 billion
in total.”).
46. See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text. R
47. See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text. R
48. See infra notes ????-147 and accompanying text. R
49. For a discussion of the Sports Agent Accountability Board, see infra notes
148-169.  For concluding remarks and a discussion of the benefits of this new R
board, see infra notes 170-172. R
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II. SPORT AGENCY AS PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FIRMS
Business relationships among sport agents and athletes are
founded upon the agency principle of the agent aligning his incen-
tives with the player and using the player’s knowledge to help
achieve that player’s goals.50  In this manner, the duties and respon-
sibilities of a sport agent are similar to those of other knowledge
workers employed by professional service firms.  These firms can be
defined as organizations with the following characteristics: “knowl-
edge intensity, low capital intensity, and a professionalized work
force.”51  Typical examples of organizations and industries that
meet this definition include law, accounting, consulting, health-
care, and education.  Combining these facets yields an organization
where workers control the means of production, decisions are
made autonomously, resources are distributed heterogeneously
amongst competitors, knowledge is portable, output intangible,
and information is asymmetric between producers and consum-
ers.52  Recognizing these features is essential to analyzing the opera-
tions of any professional service firm, including sport agencies.
As the sport agency industry has evolved, aspects of profes-
sional service firms have become more pronounced as duties have
expanded and specialization has increased.  From the industry’s
early days of handshake agreements to the mergers and consolida-
tions frequent amongst today’s competitors, the field has come to
resemble the business practices and patterns of advertising and con-
sulting firms.53  Not coincidently, these types of firms are among
those getting into the agent industry.  The requirements to be a
sports agent simultaneously reflect the nature of professional ser-
vices firms and the need for added regulation of sport agents.  The
low capital needs are even more extreme in this industry where the
50. See William Rothstein, The Business of Sports Representation: Agent Evolution
in the “Industry”, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 23-33 (2009) (tracing history of
agency principles as applied to athletics).
51. See Andrew von Nordenflycht, What is a Professional Service Firm? Toward a
Theory and Taxonomy of Knowledge Intensive Firms, 35 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 155, 174
(2009) (explaining basic characteristics of professional service firms).
52. See PETER MILLS & KEVIN SNYDER, KNOWLEDGE SERVICES MANAGEMENT: OR-
GANIZING AROUND INTERNAL MARKETS, 1-22 (2010) (defining knowledge services
and tracing its evolution through America’s shift from manufacturing to knowl-
edge-based industry).
53. See Brady, supra note 4 (discussing Arnold Palmer’s famous hand-shake R
deal with Mark McCormack); see generally Legacy Sport Group and the Agency Sports
Management Merge to Form the Legacy Agency, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 23, 2012), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/legacy-sport-group-and-the-agency-sports-
management-merge-to-form-the-legacy-agency-137886193.html (announcing
merger of sports representation businesses).
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only requirement to be an agent is to have a client.  While leagues
and players unions may require registration and certification to
handle player contracts, negotiating for endorsement deals or pro-
viding financial advice does not require such certification and is
fairly unregulated, with numerous individuals performing these du-
ties while working within large firms or directly with an athlete.54
The NFLPA has a voluntary regulations program for financial advi-
sors.55  The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA)
has also started a limited certification for those solely recruiting
players for a player agent or those providing client maintenance
services to a player.56
Similar to other professional service firms, the customer or ath-
lete in this case, lacks expertise in the specific area under advise-
ment and is thus, trusting that the service provider is working
toward their best interests.  In the sport agent industry, the cus-
tomer is a young athlete with little experience in the field of negoti-
ation.  With this profile, the customers are particularly susceptible
to exploitation by unqualified agents who control the process and
final outcomes, with minimal input from clients.
Athletes experience tremendous “information asymmetry”
when choosing a representative for contract negotiations, financial,
54. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935) [hereinaf-
ter NLRA] (granting workers broad rights to unionize).  Section 9 allows unions to
be the exclusive representatives of employees, in this case professional athletes
who are employed by professional teams, and to bargain wages, hours and other
conditions of employment.  Unions certify and register agents to negotiate such
terms consistent with the respective collective bargaining agreements.  Endorse-
ment deals and financial advice are not covered by section 9 and unions do not
have the authority to certify agents performing these tasks. See Collins v. NBPA,
850 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (D. Colo. 1991) (“Under the NLRA the employer—the
NBA member team—may not bargain with any agent other than one designated by
the union and must bargain with the agent chosen by the union.”); see also White v.
Nat’l Football League, 92 F. Supp. 2d 918 (D. Minn. 2002) (“Under federal labor
law, the NFLPA has exclusive authority to negotiate with NFL clubs on behalf of
NFL players.”).
55. See NFLPA Financial Advisor Frequently Asked Questions, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/FAQs/Financial-Advisor-FAQs/ (discussing
aspects of Financial Advisor Registration Program).  The NFLPA began a voluntary
certification program for financial advisors.  The program is voluntary because the
NLRA does not give unions authority to regulate financial advisors and the NFLPA
cannot require financial advisors to be certified by the NFLPA before they re-
present a player. See supra note 54. R
56. See MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, § 2(C)(2), MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://reg.mlbpaagent.org/
Documents/AgentForms/Agent%20Regulations.pdf  [hereinafter MLBPA Regs.]
(“An individual granted such a Limited Certification is authorized thereby to en-
gage, on behalf of a Player Agent, in Recruiting or providing Client Maintenance
Services.”); see also Heitner, supra note 26, at 263-70 (discussing unenforceability of R
MLBPA Regulations governing player agents).
12
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or legal advice, and in most other services offered by an agent.57
Further complicating matters is the intangibility of the final output.
The quality of the work is difficult to assess, particularly with no
ability to know the results of different decisions.  Although an ath-
lete may be content with a marketing deal, there is no way to know
if a different agent could have produced a more favorable result.
With professional services, the customer is unlikely to possess simi-
lar expertise or industry knowledge and thus will have difficulty
judging the quality of the output.
Information asymmetry is typically overcome through signaling
mechanisms such as requiring lawyers to pass the bar exam, ac-
countants to take and pass the Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
examination, and doctors to obtain board certification.  However,
sport agents must signal using other methods.  Since no indepen-
dent body attesting to the quality of their work exists, agents are
forced to use their alliances with other players that they represent
or their employment within a large marketing or agency firm as a
signal of the quality of their work.58  Recent trends have seen merg-
ers and acquisitions of sport agencies, with moves to consolidate
services under one roof.59  In addition to the economies of scale
created by these mergers, agents are able to use the firm’s brand as
an asset that can help lure athletes into their practice.
As firms acquire talent, they begin to differentiate from com-
petitors in the number of services offered, business partnerships,
and expertise.  Over time, this polarization distributes resources
heterogeneously, thus increasing the difficulty of the athlete’s task
in comparing potential agents.  While firms merge for efficiencies
57. See Kenneth Lehn Marker, Information Asymmetries in Baseball’s Free Agent
Market, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 37 (1984) (summarizing different types of information
asymmetry in professional baseball).  Information asymmetry is defined as a situa-
tion that favors the more knowledgeable party in a transaction.  See Information
Asymmetry, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/infor-
mation-asymmetry.html#ixzz1rYSXAPrQ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (defining “in-
formation asymmetry” in part, as a “[s]ituation that favors the more knowledgeable
party in a transaction”).
58. For example, a baseball agent who obtains MLBPA certification is allowed
to represent players on a team’s forty-man roster.  The MLBPA specifically states
that the certification is not an endorsement by the MLBPA of the quality of work
of the agent.  The certification simply allows the agent to perform the work.
MLBPA Regs., § 4(K), supra note 56 (“In addition, the MLBPA’s granting of certifi- R
cation as a Player Agent is not intended to be and does not constitute any guaran-
tee, warranty or endorsement by the MLBPA of the quality of any Player Agent’s
Performance.”).
59. See Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete
Representation, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 193 (2004) (discussing consolidation of sports
representative agencies).
13
Masteralexis et al.: Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sports Agent
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-FEB-13 9:54
82 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 69
in information gathering and client services, mergers and large
agency practices also suggest a level of competency that a single
agent may lack unless they have numerous clients.  Even with simi-
lar quality of work, the athlete must rely on market signals given the
high degree of asymmetric information when selecting or choosing
to remain with an agent.
Another byproduct of this evolving structure is the potential
for conflicts of interest between the agent, corporate agency, and
the athlete.60  Consolidation within large corporations also in-
creases barriers to entry for new agents.  For other professional ser-
vice workers, such as new accountants, doctors, or lawyers,
assimilation within a larger organization is needed to access clients,
technology, specialized industry information, and assistance com-
pleting the engagement of a new client.  However, fledgling sport
agents are charged with recruiting all of their own clients and are
capable of outsourcing any expertise that they lack.
While there are many similarities in the structural elements of
sport agencies and professional services firms, the primary differ-
ence lies in the relationship of the firms with players associations.
Players associations elect to defer salary negotiations to agents
rather than bargain wages as a group.  Sports agents are allowed to
negotiate player contracts because the players unions have dele-
gated their exclusive representation on that issue to the agents.61
In order to protect its collectively bargained wages and benefits,
players associations regulate agent activity and certification.62
Answering to union regulations is unique in that agents play a
minimal role in determining certification or other ethical conduct
requirements.63  Additionally, because regulating agents is not its
central mission, players unions devote few resources to monitoring
agents and historically have taken little interest in enforcing poli-
60. See David Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes:
Agents, “Attorney-Agents,” Full-Service Agencies, and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 31 (2003) (outlining areas where conflicts of interest may arise).
61. See 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, Article IV, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS
ASS’N (2011), available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf
(explaining guidelines of player negotiation in MLB under MLBPA players’ agree-
ment).  For a discussion of the NLRA section 9 and exclusive representation, see
supra note 54 and accompanying text. R
62. See H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981)
(holding theater union protected by statutory labor exemption when regulating
agents due to their impact on collectively-bargained wages and benefits).
63. However, agents were consulted in the process of developing MLBPA’s
2010 agent regulations.  Two authors of this article are both MLBPA certified
agents and have personal knowledge that the MLBPA solicited input from all
agents prior to issuing the new regulations in October 2010.
14
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cies put into place.64  A players union’s primary role is to represent
its members in collective bargaining and labor issues.
Further, there is a perception that powerful agents with many
clients may have greater influence on players than the player as-
sociations, which may make it more difficult for players associations
to police their certified agents.  A recent example that creates this
perception is the reported pressure to decertify placed on the
NBPA in 2011 by NBA players, which was allegedly led by influential
NBA agents.65  The NBA’s powerful agents were pushing the NBPA
Executive Director to disclaim or decertify the union.66  Another
example is the discontent expressed by Commissioner Selig when
the MLBPA did not discipline a prominent agent for allegations
that his agency loaned money to a Dominican player supposedly
violating the MLBPA’s agent regulations.67  Given these difficulties
for unions to regulate agents and their companies, meaningful
change, led by Congress, must take place to ensure that agents are
appropriately regulated.
III. BACKGROUND ON SELF-REGULATION AND CO-REGULATION
The nature of the relationship between professional service
firms and their clients demands some form of regulation, whether
from the industry itself, the government, or a third party.  In gen-
eral, the purpose of the regulation is to ensure fair competition
through uniform rules and standards of conduct, while protecting
the rights of the industry’s stakeholders.  Within professional ser-
vice firms, this has been attempted by numerous models, but almost
always involves some sort of self-regulation.  Organizations such as
the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Bar Asso-
64. See Alec Powers, The Need to Regulate Sports Agents, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
253, 264-66 (1994) (noting primary mission of players associations is to serve as
certified collective-bargaining agents for players).
65. See Sam Amick, NBA Agents Growing in Favor of Players’ Union Decertification,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 17, 2011, 1:57 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2011/writers/sam_amick/09/17/nba.labor.decertification/index.html (discussing
decertification situation in 2011); see also Murray Chass, Pro Basketball: Decertification
has Court Date it May Not Use, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at sec. 1 p.27, http://www.
nytimes.com/1995/08/05/sports/pro-basketball-decertification-has-court-date-it-
may-not-use.html (discussing how NBA filed unfair labor practice charges against
prominent NBA agents for “defrauding N.B.A. players” into signing decertification
forms).
66. See Chass, supra note 65 (noting NBA superstars’ agents use their status R
and clientele as leverage in negotiating with NBA).
67. See Schmidt, supra note 36 (stating Commissioner Selig and other high R
ranking MLB officials are discontent with  MLBPA for failing to punish unethical
conduct by prominent agent).
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ciation (ABA), and the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA) all serve to certify practitioners, set industry
standards, and educate service providers about industry trends.
Self-regulation provides indicators of competency and quality for
industry professionals and recourse for harmed clients.
Self-regulation has emerged through trade organizations in
these industries to create a code of ethics and facilitate discussion
on the field’s emerging issues.68  Ensuring compliance with federal
and state laws was not an original goal of these organizations, nor is
it a driving factor today.69  The ABA, along with the AICPA and
AMA, serves to enhance opportunities for its members and increase
the profession’s credibility.70  The goal is that members of these or-
ganizations will hold themselves to a standard higher than the legal
minimum and stay in line with industry targets.71  The setting of
industry conduct standards requires significant cooperation
amongst competitors, as they determine how they will restrain
themselves from behaving in unethical or inappropriate ways.  In
essence, by agreeing to higher standards, the entire industry is sig-
naling values such as trust, honor, and competence.  Rather than
enforcing laws and policies, the regulatory goal of such organiza-
tions is directed towards defining industry norms and values.72
Despite the lofty goals, regulatory attempts by these trade orga-
nizations are not entirely noble.  Often times, these organizations
68. See Cyril Chantler, The Purpose and Limits to Professional Self-regulation,
302:18 J. OF THE AMA 2032-33 (2009) (explaining importance of self-regulation in
professional fields that require trust from clients). See History of the American Bar
Association, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/
history.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (stating ABA’s role in legal profession).
69. See generally ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR ASS’N http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2012) (stating goals of ABA including serving members, improving law profession,
eliminating bias, and advancing law); see also AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, AM.
INST. OF CPAS, http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/
Pages/default.aspx (setting forth goals of AICPA, including principles of conduct,
integrity and objectivity, responsibilities to clients and colleagues, and standards of
accounting); AMA Healthier Life Steps, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.
org/ama/pub/physician-resources/public-health/promoting-healthy-lifestyles.
page (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (presenting goals in improving public health
through “patient-physician partnership”).
70. See ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 69 (noting that ABA provides bene- R
fits, programs, and services to promote its members’ quality of life and growth as
professionals).
71. See Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institu-
tional Perspective, 19:4 L. & POLICY 363-414 (1997) (explaining what self-regulation
is, its strengths and weaknesses, and its applicability to professional life).
72. See ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 69 (explaining goals and objectives R
of ABA including improving  legal profession by promoting highest quality legal
education and promoting competence, ethical conduct, and professionalism).
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engage in regulatory policies in an attempt to avoid more direct
government regulation.73  In theory, trade groups and players as-
sociations are in a better position to alter an individual’s actions
due to their expertise within the industry and their ability to pres-
sure their members to fall in line for the benefit of the organiza-
tion.  Ideally, once the policies are set, they would be easier to
enforce and could more directly target the problem.  However, this
rarely happens in practice.  Trade organizations have been criti-
cized for looking out for their own interests rather than the public’s
interest.74  It is likely this occurs as norms are defined and various
parties are forced to compromise on the ideal structure for regula-
tion.  The end result is a “watered down” set of standards that gives
the appearance of compliance but does little to eradicate the unde-
sirable actions.75
In the process of self-regulation, each trade group indepen-
dently defines social norms for its members.  However, social regu-
lation can be ineffective if groups cannot reach a consensus.  Self-
regulation is challenging for any industry, but conflicting or lax eth-
ical guidelines create confusion, and add to an environment where
the best interests of society are secondary to self-interest.  For this
reason, medicine, law, and accounting delegate additional govern-
mental regulation to public bodies.
Government regulation in place of self-regulation also has
flaws that result in difficult implementation and less than ideal out-
comes.  Often times, government involvement as a regulator stems
from legal and ethical issues that garner a high degree of public
attention.  One such example is the increase in government regula-
tion of airport security after the attacks of September 11, 2001.76
The government had previously outsourced security operations to
the airlines, which in turn, hired private contractors.  Recognizing
that the airlines had financial incentives to minimize security costs,
73. See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 71, at 369-70 (noting organizations R
give appearance of regulation to ward off government intervention, however, these
organizations are actually serving their own interests at expense of public).
74. See id. at 370 (stating self-regulation oftentimes serves to keep government
oversight away and to deceive public into thinking irresponsible organizations are
responsible).
75. See ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS 238 (1990), available at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/
ft8f59p27j/ (discussing case study in which one of four private regulation stan-
dards were weak and watered down).
76. See Sidney Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389,
415 (2003) (stating that “there is no better example of the adverse impact of a
private actor’s opportunistic behavior than the failure of the airlines to provide
adequate security for airports prior to September 11 . . . .”).
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the government responded by further regulating security policies
and procedures, adding rules to the already complicated land-
scape.77  Though sometimes necessary, direct government regula-
tion is inefficient due to the higher transaction cost of accessing
industry knowledge and implementing the system.78  These issues
lead to regulations that are more easily circumvented due to the
information asymmetry by the regulator and those being regulated.
Further, direct government regulation does not include social as-
pects that encourage members of an industry to develop social
norms that guide behaviors.79
These aspects make government regulation a possible solution
when setting policies on economic matters, but mostly ineffective
when dealing with social conduct.80  In these cases, co-regulation is
a potential solution that has been implemented in several profes-
sional service industries.  Co-regulation can take multiple forms but
typically involves industry members defining standards of practice,
government ratification of these standards, and enforcement
through trade organizations.81  The creation of the PCAOB illus-
trates a shift to this paradigm.82  In response to Enron and other
accounting scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which implemented a form of co-regulation in place of previ-
ous self-regulation in the accounting industry.83  In effect, this co-
regulation serves to obscure the boundaries between roles of regu-
latory actors, structure, actors within the regulatory regime, and
functions of the regulation.84
77. See id. (explaining that private actors have profit-seeking motive to act effi-
ciently when complying with regulations).
78. See id. at 390 (noting these governmental decisions are “make-or-buy” de-
cisions that must be made based on financial impacts of regulatory action).
79. See id. at 423 n.128 (discussing how certain factors may determine whether
organizations will voluntarily comply with regulations without acknowledging regu-
latory penalties).
80. See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 71, at 365 (drawing distinctions be- R
tween regulation on economic and social matters).
81. See id. at 365 (discussing different types of distinctions made within self-
regulation).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006) (establishing Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board and its duties). See About the PCAOB, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVER-
SIGHT BD., http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 26,
2011) (providing examples of industry enforcing standard of practice through gov-
ernment ratification of PCAOB).
83. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 40 (providing new and enhanced standards R
for public companies in United States). See Shapiro, supra note 76 (describing R
issues surrounding enforcement of agency regulations).
84. See Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the
Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 592
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A decision that must be made when regulating industries is
where to regulate.  For example, how should individuals and their
firms be incentivized and punished if they fail to adhere to the stan-
dards?  An analysis of the location of regulation in professional ser-
vice firms finds differences based on the industry’s relationship to
clients and to the general public.  In healthcare, law, and account-
ing, individuals are licensed and governed by a set of standards, e.g.
laws often influenced by trade organizations.  Failure to comply
with these standards results in loss of license and opportunity to
participate in the industry.  While this punishment may be enough
of a deterrent, discipline can also be given to the employer of an
offending employee.  For example, CPAs may lose their license if
found committing fraud, but their accounting firm will also face
penalties including fines, suspensions, and ultimately could lose
their entire practice.85  Holding employers accountable increases
the social pressure to adhere to the laws and standards that support
the firm and individuals’ reputations.  In fact, the MLBPA player
agent regulations hold certified agents vicariously liable for activi-
ties of other partner agents, recruiters or client maintenance prov-
iders who fail to provide adequate supervision to ensure
compliance and observance of reasonable care.86
Accounting firms are held liable for employee behaviors be-
cause implicitly, the audits are conducted to provide trust in au-
dited financial statements that are used by the public to guide
business decisions.  Simple regulation by the government or by self-
regulating bodies fails to provide the combination of enforcement
and social norms that are needed to curtail undesired behaviors.
To provide enforcement of appropriate business standards, co-reg-
ulation is needed to direct incentives of individuals and firms.
IV. PRIOR ATTEMPTS AT REGULATING SPORT AGENTS
The activities of sport agents are primarily regulated by NCAA
regulations, the UAAA which has been adopted by 42 states, the
federal government’s SPARTA, and the regulations of the profes-
(2010) (recognizing “blurring of the boundaries” between different layers of regu-
lation theory).
85. See Arthur Andersen Goes Out of Business, ABC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2002), http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/Decade/arthur-andersen-business/story?id=9279255
(discussing terminal consequences for Arthur Andersen LLP for shredding docu-
ments related to audit of Enron).
86. See MLBPA Regs., § 5(C), supra note 56, (explaining, in Vicarious Liability R
of Player Agents and Applicants section, standard of conduct for all player agents).
19
Masteralexis et al.: Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sports Agent
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 20 19-FEB-13 9:54
88 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 69
sional athletes’ players associations.87  This array of rules and regu-
lations is ineffective and does not serve the needs of the athletes,
leagues, universities, professional teams, or fans.
A. NCAA Regulations
NCAA rules prohibit amateur college athletes from retaining
an agent.  An athlete will be declared ineligible to play sports if “he
or she has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an
agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or
reputation in that sport.”88  An athlete cannot enter into a verbal or
written agreement to have an agent represent him or her in future
professional sports negotiations that are to take place after his or
her eligibility has expired.89  An athlete can secure “advice from a
lawyer concerning a proposed professional sports contract,” pro-
vided that lawyer will not become the athlete’s agent at a later
point.90  However, a lawyer “may not be present during discussions
of a contract offer with a professional organization or have any di-
rect contact (in person, by telephone or by mail) with a profes-
sional sports organization” on behalf of the athlete.91
NCAA by-laws clearly preclude student-athletes from doing an-
ything more than talking with an agent.92  All potential induce-
ments, from taking an athlete to dinner, to giving an athlete a ride
in a car, to providing anything of value to the athlete, violate NCAA
by-laws and thereby, can result in the loss of athletic eligibility.93
There is no recourse against agents, pursuant to NCAA regulations,
since they are not members of the NCAA.  The NCAA only has au-
thority to penalize its member institutions and student-athletes.
The NCAA Bylaws prohibiting any representation of an athlete
by an agent or lawyer ignores the reality that amateur athletes who
aspire and have the talent to play professional sports would benefit
87. See id.
88. See 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.3.1, NCAA (2011), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf (explaining
NCAA prohibition on use of agents by its athletes).
89. See id. § 12.3.1.1 (extending prohibition on agency agreements to future
negotiations).
90. See id. § 12.3.2 (allowing athletes provisional consultation with lawyers re-
garding agency agreements).
91. See id. § 12.3.2.1 (prohibiting lawyer participation in athlete discussions
with professional organizations).
92. See Ted Curtis, The Regulation of Sports Agents, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS 1-10 (Gary Uberstine ed, 2011).
93. See 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, §12.3.1.2, supra note 88 (warning R
that receipt of certain benefits from perspective agents may result in athlete
eligibility).
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from representation.  Signing a professional contract is a process
for an athlete, not simply a negotiation session.  An experienced
sports agent guides athletes through the pre-draft process that be-
gins when athletes are first scouted.  Scouts for professional teams
approach players and their families to begin conversations about
the amount of compensation it will take to sign them to a contract.
An unprepared player or family member unaware of the market
value for his talent negatively impacts the drafting or signing pro-
cess.  Scouts also ask many questions about a player’s makeup, fam-
ily, and may ask a player to take psychological tests.  An agent can
help the player field these questions, prepare the player and family
with consistent messaging and guide the player through the process
of signing.  In MLB or the NHL, this may all transpire while the
athlete is in high school.  The athlete may not be prepared to nego-
tiate with a professional team employee who has years of negotiat-
ing experience.  Limiting an athlete’s access to a prepared sports
agent slants the negotiating table toward the team.  There are also
rules, such as signing dates and scholarship provisions plus prac-
tices, such as the NFL combines, pre-draft camps, and workouts that
may be unfamiliar to one who does not work in the sport industry.
The NCAA rules are unfair to amateur athletes and leave them with
no professional advice when negotiating with professional teams.94
Simply allowing for legal advice from an individual who is not an
agent, thus one who does not understand the intricacies of sport
business, harms the athlete.  NCAA regulations are also not an ef-
fective deterrent to athletes with collegiate eligibility who have de-
cided to become professional athletes, as the athletes are not
members of the NCAA.
The NCAA regulations also carry little weight with agents since
they are not NCAA members and the NCAA cannot enforce the
rules against them.95  The penalties for violating NCAA Bylaws on
agents are levied against athletes and universities and not agents.96
The number of scandals associated with agents and NCAA college
athletes demonstrates that the NCAA rules have not, in and of
94. See id. § 12.3 (explaining NCAA prohibition on use of agents by its
athletes).
95. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 280 (explaining that NCAA cannot penal- R
ize sports agents for violating its regulations).
96. See Closius, supra note 10, at 512 (describing examples of punishments R
imposed on institutions for violating NCAA bylaws).
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themselves, been a deterrent to athletes having contact with
agents.97
B. The Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA)
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws wrote the UAAA in 2000 because at that time 28 states had
differing laws to regulate agent conduct.98  The UAAA’s chief goals
are to uniformly regulate the conduct of agents and to protect the
athletes and universities.99  It has now been adopted in forty-two
states.100
The UAAA requires an agent to register, usually with the Secre-
tary of State, to represent an athlete in that state.101  The UAAA
prohibits an agent from giving false or misleading information or
promises with the intent to induce a student-athlete into signing an
agency contract and from furnishing anything of value to a student-
athlete before signing a contract.102  The UAAA requires written
notification to institutions when a college athlete signs an agency
contract before their eligibility expires.103  In addition, the UAAA
requires an agency contract to contain a notice warning the college
athlete that if they sign a contract with an agent it may cause them
to become permanently ineligible for intercollegiate
competition.104
Violations of the UAAA can be punished with criminal, civil,
and administrative penalties and fines of up to $25,000, and gives
the college or university a private right of action against the agent
for any damages.105  There are few cases of prosecution of agents
under the UAAA, but the state of Oklahoma recently created a spe-
cial sports agent prosecution team to investigate issues of agent mis-
97. See A Look at Recent College Football Scandals, supra note 11(discussing recent R
cases of misconduct in college football involving athlete interaction with agents).
98. See UNIFORM ATHLETES AGENTS ACT 1, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2000), available
at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/athlete_agents/uaaa_finalact_2000.
pdf (explaining lack of uniformity among state laws regulating agent conduct).
99. See Uniform Athlete Agents Act, What is the UAAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.
org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Uniform+Athlete+Agents+
Act+Homepage (last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (summarizing function of UAAA).
100. See id. (mapping states that have adopted UAAA).
101. See UNIFORM ATHLETES AGENTS ACT, § 5, supra note 98 (discussing regis- R
tration procedures for athlete agents).
102. See id. at § 14 (identifying prohibited conduct for athlete agents).
103. See id. at § 11 (explaining notification requirements for athlete agents).
104. See id. at § 10 (requiring agency contract to include warning of possible
ineligibility for intercollegiate competition).
105. See id. at §§ 15-17 (outlining criminal, civil, and administrative penalties
for noncompliance with UAAA).
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conduct.106  Three states, California, Michigan, and Ohio, have
their own unique laws that regulate agent conduct.107  The Attor-
ney General of Ohio has also indicated that sports agents would
suffer consequences for any malfeasance.108
C. The Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA)
In September 2004, President Bush signed SPARTA into
law.109  At that time only twenty-one states had passed the UAAA,
and SPARTA was an effort by the federal government to create a
comprehensive nationwide system of licensing for sport agents.110
SPARTA protects student athletes by prohibiting sports agents from
inducing them to sign representation contracts by providing false
or misleading information, giving gifts, providing anything of value,
and failing to disclose to the athlete that they may lose their NCAA
eligibility.111  Athletes and agents must also inform universities of
the representation contract.112  Violations of SPARTA are deemed
to be “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and are enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter “FTC”).113  Additionally,
the attorney general of any state may enforce SPARTA to enjoin any
106. See Darren Heitner, Oklahoma Creates Special Sports Agent Prosecution Team,
SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2011/09/
12/oklahoma-creates-special-sports-agent-prosecution-team/ (reporting on
Oklahoma’s recent prosecutorial initiative against sports agents).
107. See FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agent Act, NCAA (July 29, 2010), http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+
stories/July+latest+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete+Agents+Act (explaining that
California, Michigan, and Ohio have adopted their own laws to regulate athlete
agents).
108. See Joel Hammond, Ohio AG Warns Sports Agents About Improper Conduct,
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Oct. 5, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.crainscleveland.
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20101005/FREE/101009942/0/SEARCH# (re-
porting that Ohio’s Attorney General intends to crack down on inappropriate in-
teractions between sports agents and student athletes).
109. See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7807
(2006) (standardizing regulation of sports agent conduct).
110. See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on H.R. 361 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
18-22 (2003) (statement of Rep. Bart Gordon), available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju87094.000/hju87094_0f.htm (emphasizing
lack of uniformity among state laws regulating sports agent conduct and asserting
that SPARTA would help correct this lack of uniformity).
111. See § 7802 (forbidding agents from conveying misrepresentations or gifts
to athletes and requiring that agents make certain disclosures to athletes).
112. See § 7805 (requiring notice be given to athletic directors when athletes
and agents negotiate agency agreements).
113. See § 7803 (“A violation of this chapter shall be treated as a violation of a
rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section
18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).”).
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unfair or deceptive practice, enforce compliance, and obtain resti-
tution and damages for the residents of the state.114  Damages for
violations of SPARTA include actual losses and expenses incurred
by the educational institution, and costs such as attorney’s fees.115
Congress expressed a clear desire to have SPARTA and the
UAAA work in concert:
It is the sense of Congress that States should enact the
Uniform Athlete Agents Act of 2000 drafted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, to protect student athletes and the integrity of ama-
teur sports from unscrupulous sports agents.  In particu-
lar, it is the sense of Congress that States should enact the
provisions relating to the registration of sports agents, the
required form of contract, the right of the student athlete
to cancel an agency contract, the disclosure requirements
relating to record maintenance, reporting, renewal, no-
tice, warning, and security, and the provisions for reci-
procity among the States.116
Commentators have suggested that the law is “one-sided” and that
only the agents are regulated and the athletes are perceived as play-
ing no role in the practice of inducements by “selling” their services
to universities, for example the alleged actions of Cam Newton’s
father.117  In other words, the agent, the student and perhaps the
university in the recruiting process may commit unfair and decep-
tive practices, yet only the agent is penalized for unfair and decep-
tive practices.118  An additional criticism of SPARTA is that it is
rarely enforced.  According to an FTC spokesman, the agency has
had “very, very few” complaints and taken no enforcement
actions.119
114. See § 7804 (identifying civil actions to enforce SPARTA).
115. See § 7805 (listing civil remedies available for violation of SPARTA).
116. § 7807.
117. For a discussion of college football scandals, including the one involving
Cam Newton’s father, see A Look at Recent College Football Scandals, supra note
11(discussing attempt by Cam Netwon’s father to auction off his son’s football R
skills to Mississippi State for $180,000).
118. See generally Ohio State’s Urban Meyer Defends Recruiting Practices to Fellow Big
Ten Coaches, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 2012, available at http://blog.pennlive.com/
patriotnewssports/2012/02/ohio_states_urban_meyer_defend.html (describing
deceptive practices and corresponding punitive measures towards agents).
119. See Zagier, supra note 25(explaining that regulations lack enforcement). R
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In fact, several high-profile cases involving agent malfeasance
have occurred since these laws have been passed.120  These situa-
tions have had a detrimental impact on the industry and have in-
creased the need for oversight.  Federal and state regulations have
failed, due in part to their inability to address the social norms of
the profession or create momentum for change within the industry.
As scandals occur, several states have tried to increase scrutiny of
agents and to toughen punishments for offenders.  For example,
Texas has assessed fines of $17,000 and amended its regulations to
make violations by agents or runners a felony, punishable with up
to ten years in prison.121  Given the lack of enforcement of the laws
already on the books, this additional legislation is unlikely to have
the desired impact.  Further, the laws only target agents and ath-
letes at the collegiate level and do not address unethical behaviors
committed toward professional athletes by agents.
D. Player’s Association Regulations
Pursuant to the NLRA, players associations are the exclusive
bargaining agents of their respective players and have the authority
to certify agents to negotiate individual salary and additional bene-
fits for the players over and above the minimum requirements of
the respective collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”).122  All of
the players associations, with the exception of the MLSPU, have
regulations that determine the requirements for agent certification
and to regulate agents.123  The MLSPU has not yet created a certifi-
cation program and utilizes FIFA Agent regulations in place of cre-
ating their own.124
120. See J.P. Giglio, Associate UNC Coach Said to be Part of Probe, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (N.C.) (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/08/
09/1612668/associate-coach-said-to-be-part.html (noting examples of scandals).
121. See Texas Cracks Down on Unethical Agents, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 18,
2011, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=6564280 (detail-
ing reasons for ineffectiveness of regulations).
122. See NLRA, §§151-169, supra note 54 (highlighting section 9 of NLRA). R
The players associations that are discussed in this article are the MLBPA, NFLPA,
National Hockey League Players Association (hereinafter “NHLPA”), National Bas-
ketball Players Association (hereinafter “NBPA”), and the Major League Soccer
Players Union (hereinafter “MLSPU”) (describing reasons for scandals particularly
relating to MLSPU).
123. See Becoming an Agent, MLSPU HOME, http://www.mlsplayers.org/be-
come_agent.html (last visited Oct. 9 12, 2012) (stating “Currently, we do not have
agent regulations. Thus, there is no certification process and/or exam to become
an agent.”).
124. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 281; see also Collective Bargaining Agreement R
between Major League Soccer and Major League Soccer Players Union § 18.3, U.S. SOCCER
(Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.ussoccer.com/About/Federation-Services/
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Commentators have noted that players unions have largely
failed to curb the conduct of unethical agents.125  A review of the
regulations for the MLBPA, NFLPA, NHLPA, and NBPA agent reg-
ulations shows that they are primarily concerned with ensuring
agents are qualified, by education and experience, to represent
players.126  NFLPA agents and MLBPA agents must also attend an-
nual meetings with players associations to keep abreast with devel-
opments in the industry.127  Typically, among other things, agent
regulations prohibit the agent from providing monetary induce-
ments to a player or his family to induce a player to utilize his ser-
vices or providing materially false or misleading information to a
player.128  The MLBPA and the NFLPA have updated their agent
regulations most recently, in 2010 and 2007, respectively, and have
been the most proactive in attempting to address agent conduct.
The MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents were first
promulgated in 1988 by the MLBPA’s Executive Board, which is
comprised of Major Leaguers.  The new MLBPA regulations are an
ambitious attempt at curtailing client stealing and questionable
agent conduct that had the effect of distracting players from per-
forming their job on the field and had a negative impact on player
salary negotiations.129
Player-Agents.aspx (stating MLSPU agrees to create certification program).  It has
not yet been developed as of August, 2012. See id.  U.S. Soccer, the governing body
of all soccer in the United States, requires agents to follow FIFA regulations. See
FIFA Regulations Players’ Agents, FIFA (July 4, 2012), available at http://www.fifa.
com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/55/18/players_agents_
regulations_2008.pdf.
125. See Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in the Player Representation Busi-
ness: Unions Should Be the Exclusive Representatives of the Players, 42 WILLIAMETTE L.
REV. 737, 760-62 (2006) (explaining inability of unions to curb agent
malfeasance).
126. See, e.g., NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors, § 2, NFL PLAYERS
ASS’N (Mar. 2007), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/
files/PDFs/SCAA/NFLPA_Regulations_Contract_Advisors.pdf [hereinafter
NFLPA Regs.] (requiring Contract Advisors to have undergraduate degree from
accredited four-year college/university but granting exceptions if applicant has sig-
nificant negotiating experience.)
127. See id. § 3A (detailing further requirements); see also MLBPA Regs.,
§ 5(A)(5), supra note 56 (providing stricter guidelines for agents). R
128. See MLBPA Regs., § 5(B)(5), supra note 56 (explaining that monetary in- R
ducement is prohibited); see also NFLPA Regs., § 3(B)(4), supra note 126 (prohibit- R
ing agents’ communication of false information).
129. See MLBPA Regs., § 1(A), supra note 56 (stating that primary objectives of R
the new MLPBPA regulations include: “[t]o establish and enforce minimum re-
quirements for eligibility to become a Player Agent and uniform standards of con-
duct and fiduciary responsibility for all Player Agents . . . [t]o afford each Player
the opportunity to select a certified Player Agent who has agreed to abide by these
Regulations and to advise Players honestly, competently, loyally, and zealously as a
fiduciary . . . [t]o afford each Player the opportunity to make better-informed deci-
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The MLBPA required previously certified agents to reapply for
certification upon passage of the new regulations in October
2010.130  The 2010 regulations required individuals who recruit cli-
ents for an agent and those who provide “client maintenance ser-
vices” to apply for a lesser certification.131  Agents must inform the
Players Association if they speak to a player they do not represent,
or intend to do so, or travel to meet a player they do not re-
present.132  Often agents attempt to recruit players away from their
current agents as they are eligible for free agency or salary arbitra-
tion since that is when a player will receive a significant increase in
compensation and thus, the agent will receive a fee increase.  The
new regulations prevent a player in this stage in his career from
changing agents “unless they first consult with the MLBPA.”133  This
consultation requirement is an attempt by the MLBPA to monitor
the recruitment of their members and an attempt to limit overly
aggressive recruitment by agents seeking clients.  If a dispute arises
between a player and an agent it must be resolved by mandatory
arbitration.134  The new regulations state that no agent may provide
or promise anything of value to a player he does not already re-
present.135  However, an agent may supply free baseball equipment
to existing clients up to $1,500 per year.  Providing more would be
considered an improper inducement.136  The new regulations also
call for a five-to-seven member Player Agent Advisory Committee
appointed by the MLBPA’s Executive Director for the purpose of
sions about his choice of certified Player Agent . . . and by regulating the conduct
of those persons . . . engaged . . . in Recruiting and providing Client Maintenance
Services for players; To ensure uniformity and consistency in the rules and stan-
dards applicable to Player Agents . . . notwithstanding the different, and sometimes
inconsistent, laws, rules and regulations of the many national, state, and local juris-
dictions that might otherwise govern those activities; To provide both Players and
Player Agents with fair, cost-effective and expeditious procedures for privately
resolving any disputes.”).
130. See id. § 4(E) (requiring more strict certification guidelines).
131. See id. § 4(D) (requiring lesser certification for agents).
132. See id. § 5(A)(11) (prohibiting travel to meet players who are not their
clients).
133. See id. § 6(L) (requiring consultation before switching agents)
134. See id. §§ 6(J), 7.  For a full discussion of the new MLBPA regulations, see
Gregg Clifton & Jeffrey Toppel, MLBPA Issues New Sweeping Regulations Governing
Agents, SPORTS LITIG. REP. (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.hackneypubli-
cations.com/sla/archive/001133.php; see also Darren A. Heitner, supra note 34. R
135. See MLBPA Regs., § 5(B)(5), supra note 56.  Previous MLBPA regulations R
also prohibited agents from giving athletes money or other things of value to a
player as an inducement for the player to hire or remain with that agent. See id.
136. See id. § 5(B)(5)(d) (detailing gift amounts that are allowed and
prohibited).
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reviewing the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of
the regulations.137
In March 2007 the NFLPA amended their regulations for Con-
tract Advisors or agents.138  The NFLPA agent regulations are sub-
stantial and detailed in an effort to protect their player-members
and to guard against agent misconduct.  Among the more promi-
nent regulations, the NFLPA requires agents to “comply with state
and federal laws,” “act at all times as a fiduciary for NFL players,”
and “comply with the stated policies of the NFLPA”.139  The NFLPA
regulations prohibit agents from: “engaging in activities that create
a conflict of interest in the effective representation of NFL play-
ers”;140 “engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, and de-
ceit”;141 “providing or offering money or any other thing of value to
any player or prospective player to induce or encourage that player
to utilize his/her services”;142 and “providing materially false or mis-
leading information to any player or prospective player in the con-
text of recruiting the player as a client.”143  The NFLPA also has a
voluntary program to certify financial advisors in order to monitor
their conduct.144  Despite the NFLPA’s regulations, designed to
protect their members against agent misconduct, scandals continue
to arise every season.145
Enforcement of current agent regulations at the union level is
difficult because each players association has different require-
ments for becoming an agent, maintaining certification status, and
procedures for investigating and resolving complaints.  In addition,
professional leagues have no legal authority to become directly in-
volved with agent regulation, because it is an inner-union matter.146
137. See id. § 9 (describing procedural requirements for committee).
138. See NFLPA Regs., supra note 128 (describing amendments to NFLPA R
regulations).
139. See id. § 3(A)(14) (noting new amendment for mandatory compliance
with state and federal law); see also id. § 3(A)(17) (providing for fiduciary relation-
ships); id. § 3(A)(18) (emphasizing compliance requirements).
140. See id. § 3(B)(8) (providing further player protection).
141. See id. § 3(B)(14) (explaining dishonesty in any form will not be
tolerated).
142. See id. § 3(B)(2) (prohibiting inducement through monetary
mechanisms).
143. See NFLPA Regs., § 3(B)(4), supra note 126 (reemphasizing importance R
of candor in the player-agent relationship).
144. See NLRA, supra note 54 (describing pioneering program). R
145. See supra notes 11-18 (noting persistence of scandal within industry). R
146. However, leagues can support union regulations in the CBA.  For exam-
ple, the NBA CBA prohibits teams from negotiating with agents who have not been
certified by the NBPA.  Teams are fined $20,000 for violating this rule. See 2005
Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXVI, § 2, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N
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Players’ associations exist to help their members negotiate wages,
hours and terms and conditions of employment and were not in-
tended to police the rough and tumble world of agent behavior.147
V. CO-REGULATION OF SPORTS AGENTS-THE NEW SPORT AGENT
OVERSIGHT BOARD
Congress’ passage of SPARTA was well intended, but evidence
has shown that it is infrequently enforced and should be
amended.148  In order to strengthen the enforcement of SPARTA,
as well as ensure consistent enforcement of players association
rules, NCAA rules, the UAAA and to ensure consistent ethical stan-
dards nationwide, the Sport Agent Accountability Board (SPAAB)
should be created by Congress.  The SPAAB will be modeled after
the PCAOB of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.149  The PCAOB it-
self was built upon the previous structure of regulation performed
by the AICPA by conducting audits of accounting firms with pub-
licly traded clients and enforcing legal and ethical standards.150
The SPAAB will not be a government agency, but an indepen-
dent nonprofit corporation, run by five members with impeccable
reputations in the sport industry.151  The FTC will appoint all
SPAAB members after seeking nominations and input from profes-
sionals from college sports, the players associations, professional
sport leagues, and governing bodies for individual amateur and
professional sports.  Two of the members shall have been sport
agents.152  One member shall have had a background in college
athletic administration, one in professional team sport, and one in
an individual sport such as golf, tennis or track and field.153  None
(Dec. 16, 2009), available at www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTI-
CLE%20XXXVI.pdf (identifying $20,000 fine).
147. See NLRA, supra note 54 (detailing procedures to achieve such goals). R
148. See Zagier, supra note 25(noting that more than half of states with sports R
agent laws have not yet revoked or suspended any licenses).
149. The citations to Sarbanes-Oxley in this section refer to the sections of the
Act that define the structure, duties, and responsibilities of the PCAOB, which are
used as a guide in the proposed creation of the SPAAB. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006) (detailing structure, duties, and responsibilities of
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
150. See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, § 51, supra note 69, (stating code’s R
purpose of guiding members’ performance of professional responsibilities).
151. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006) (identifying
that PCAOB has nonprofit corporation powers); see also § 101(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 7211(e)(1) (identifying PCAOB’s five member board composition).
152. See § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2) (requiring two certified public
accountants on PCAOB).
153. See id. (suggesting importance of board members’ backgrounds).
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of the members of SPAAB, concurrent with their service on the
SPAAB, shall be employed as an agent by any other person, or en-
gaged in any other professional or business activity, and they may
not be engaged in employment or practice in the sport industry.154
Funding for SPAAB would be derived from the primary stake-
holders.155  Funding would be split amongst the players associa-
tions, NCAA, major college conferences (SEC, PAC-12, Big 12,
etc.), professional leagues, and through licensing fees paid by the
agents.  This Board would replace the sports agent regulation work
done by these groups and thereby, it would redirect their current
expenses toward the costs of operating the SPAAB.  Funding would
be pro-rated based upon the stakeholder’s level of reliance on the
SPAAB.  For instance, the Southeastern Conference may have far
more need for the SPAAB and pay a larger fee, than a smaller con-
ference such as the Ivy League. Organizations in self-regulating in-
dustries often contribute financially to the governing institution.
For example, the PCAOB is funded through fees paid by public
companies being audited and by public accounting firms, which
register and pay a pre-determined amount based on their number
of clients.156  Audit firms are overseen by the PCAOB to ensure that
the system is working properly.  The PCAOB provides confidence
over the entire audit process, protects the investment of audit fees,
and adds to public trust in the validity of financial reporting.  Prior
to the creation of the PCAOB, the purchase of audit services could
be viewed as payment within a self-regulating industry.  Public com-
panies are analogous to athletes and sport organizations, while the
agents are analogous to the professional service audit firms.
The SPAAB will promulgate rules, regulations, and a code of
conduct for the certification and discipline of all agents who re-
present professional athletes in the United States. The chief duties
of the SPAAB will be to certify sports agents who intend to conduct
business in the U.S., establish quality control and ethical standards
for those agents, conduct inspections of sports agent firms, conduct
investigations and disciplinary proceedings and impose appropriate
sanctions and enforce compliance with agent laws and regula-
154. See § 101(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(3) (detailing similar bar for PCAOB
members from engaging in other professional or business activity).
155. See § 109, 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (detailing similar funding methods for
PCAOB).
156. See PCAOB Rules, Section 7: Funding, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
BD., http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Pages/Section_7.aspx (last visited
Dec. 26, 2011) (detailing similar allocation and assessment of fees for PCAOB).
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tions.157  The SPAAB will have the power to hire staff, attorneys,
and investigators.  It will have subpoena power and the power to
compel testimony in order to fulfill its mission.158  The SPAAB shall
cooperate on an ongoing basis, and take public comment from con-
stituency groups from professional and amateur sport to ensure
that any standard, rule, or regulation promulgated by the SPAAB is
appropriate.159
Many groups devote attention to preventing agent malfeasance
with limited or ineffective results.  While these groups may balk at
being asked to fund the new SPAAB, they are concurrently devoting
resources toward solving problems with little or no positive re-
sults.160  Rather than have these organizations continue to devote
financial and intellectual resources, the SPAAB will be funded
through their pooled resources.  Given the consolidation of re-
sources and similar interests, the funding for the SPAAB may in-
volve fewer resources than is currently allocated to the matter.
Although reducing cost is not the primary intent of the organiza-
tion, this new regulatory body is designed to provide better over-
sight for similar costs.
Ultimately the level of oversight provided by the SPAAB will
determine the size of the budget and the fees needed for opera-
tions.  The primary benefit is having a central organization with the
job of investigating claims in an independent fashion.  The SPAAB
would be tasked with setting industry standards, ethical standards
and accreditation standards.  The SPAAB would also help set qual-
ity standards for what services athletes could expect from their
agent.  Numerous instances of inadequate representation or omis-
sion of duties have occurred in the past several years, including fail-
ing to execute clauses in signed contracts on the player’s behalf.161
While players may have legal retribution in these situations, the
SPAAB would also serve as a conduit for the athlete to seek action
in these situations.  Quality standards would be consistent through-
out all sports to minimize errors of competence and exploitation.
157. See § 101(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c) (describing similar duties of PCAOB).
158. See § 101(f), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(f) (describing similar powers granted to
PCAOB).
159. See § 103(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(4) (describing similar powers
granted to PCAOB).
160. See generally Coates IV, supra note 40. R
161. See NFLPA Suspends Agent Poston for Two Years, ESPN (Jul. 28, 2006, 1:27
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2530936 (detailing instance
of player contract dispute).
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In defining and assessing quality standards, measurement met-
rics would be designed by the board based on specific outcomes of
an agent’s work as well as surveys from athletes.  Common metrics
would help create similar language and comparative attributes
amongst agents.  The additional transparency of the metrics and
analysis creates higher standards and helps identify areas for indus-
try-wide improvement.  The defining of measurement metrics is not
intended to identify “failing” agents, as each client may have differ-
ent needs and desires.  However, this process could be used in a
confidential manner to boost quality of representation.  Detailed
information, including scores on certain areas, would only be
shared with the agent and would not be available to competitors or
athletes.  In this manner, the SPAAB would not have the authority
to create metrics that reward or punish certain agents.  Instead this
information is designed to help educate and build the skills of a
player representative.
Almost every professional service industry maintains some form
of certification, even if not required for participation.  These ac-
creditations boost the credibility of the agent and would eventually
become the industry norm.  In this manner, social pressure can be
exerted on agents to receive the certification and on players to se-
lect agents with the appropriate skills for their needs.  A single en-
tity to coordinate and confirm registrations and eligibility would
simplify the process and allow the SPAAB to better serve the con-
tributing organizations and agents.
Within 180 days after the SPAAB has been established all per-
sons of companies who intend to or are representing athletes must
have applied for and be certified as agents by the SPAAB.162  It will
be a violation of SPARTA for a person or company to represent a
professional athlete without obtaining SPAAB certification.  The
SPAAB shall consult with sport industry constituent groups and cre-
ate an application that ensures that sport agents possess appropri-
ate education, experience, and moral character.  Licensing of
specific agents would be conducted centrally by the SPAAB, just as
the AICPA certifies accountants.  The SPAAB would offer licensing
in numerous duties of athlete representation including contract ne-
gotiation, financial services, marketing, and legal assistance.  This
tailored approach provides detail to athletes as they shop for agents
with differing areas of expertise.  To represent an athlete, all agents
involved with either an athlete’s recruitment or finances must pass
162. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (2010) (detailing similar
mandatory registration for public accountants).
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at least one licensing examination.  This includes all runners, con-
tract negotiators, marketers, financial advisors, and legal support.
Agents could hold multiple certifications, but must pass the exam
in a given area to conduct these activities.  Structurally, this licens-
ing process is similar to how medical doctors must pass specific ex-
ams in an area of expertise.  To become a pediatric or oncology
specialist, additional certification beyond passing the boards is re-
quired.  The licensing program described here recognizes the many
divergent duties of a sports agent and attempts to create signaling
mechanisms towards competence in a given area.  This also reflects
the reality of the team of agents that supports a player off the field.
Enforcement of UAAA and SPARTA through the SPAAB
would be similar to the state of California’s implementation of the
Talent Agency Act.163  In this state law, claims are brought by musi-
cians, acting talent, and others to a Labor Commissioner if an indi-
vidual feels their manager or agent is in violation of the law.  Agents
are licensed by the Commissioner, who has the authority to strip
someone of their ability to practice, as well as to impose financial or
other remedies.164  A one year statute of limitations ensures that
claims are filed and addressed in an expedient manner.165  The
SPAAB would function in a similar manner to the Labor Commis-
sioner and handle the minor violations by canceling contracts and
agent fees where a client was obtained illegally.  This eliminates
some of the financial incentive for engaging in prohibited behav-
iors.  More serious violations would be referred to a state or federal
attorney for prosecution under UAAA and SPARTA.  All stakehold-
ers in the system (players, universities, unions, and leagues) would
have the authority to bring a claim before the Board.  Competing
agents would not have this privilege due to conflicts of interest.
The SPAAB would also have the power of subpoena to gather
information, a power that the NCAA, sport governing bodies, or
players associations lack.  Currently, those who have knowledge of a
violation may have an incentive not to fully disclose information or
to appear at an investigative hearing called by the NCAA or players
associations.  Under the current system, players may be uncomforta-
ble to report their agent.  Athletes may be swayed by friendship,
163. See David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and Their Conflicts in
the New Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 984 (2002) (“A quick reading of the TAA
demonstrates that its purpose is to protect artists from their representatives’ busi-
ness practices.”).
164. See id. at 985 (describing licensing requirement).
165. See id. at 986 (identifying that TAA established one year statute of
limitations).
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loyalty, or the sheer embarrassment of making a poor choice in an
agent.  The SPAAB would be able to subpoena documents or testi-
mony for violations giving them sufficient power and authority to
address problems in the industry.
An agent facing discipline from the SPAAB would be given due
process and the right to defend themselves in a hearing against any
accusations.  One of the criticisms levied on the current system of
player association regulation is the ability for unions to sanction
agents without a proper appeals process.166  By using private arbi-
tration to resolve disputes between agents and players, players as-
sociations have chosen a system that limits judicial appeals to rare
circumstances where an appellant must demonstrate that the arbi-
trator exceeded their scope of their authority, acted in an arbitrary
manner, or applied their own brand of industrial justice, in order
to reverse a decision.167
As with any legal proceeding, in a hearing before the SPAAB
agents would have the right to produce their own evidence and ad-
dress the charges brought against them.  This new structure pro-
vides an outlet for fact finding and discovery with the help of the
board, sport governing bodies, teams, leagues, fellow agents, un-
ions, and athletes.  Findings of malfeasance would involve punish-
ments including probation, suspension, fines, and loss of licensure.
The severity of the offense and eventual punishment would be de-
termined by recommendations from the board’s investigative team
and members of the board.
Even though the knowledge is held at the individual level and
agents control the output, firms should also be held to a standard
when regulating agent behaviors.  Corporations have sought to
purchase this knowledge in an attempt to boost their portfolio of
services and achieve synergies across other lines of their operations.
In this manner, firms looking towards acquisitions may be incen-
tivized to disregard an agent’s methods of recruitment in order to
reap the benefits of the affiliation with the athlete.  The business
being sought is indirectly the agent’s client, with the agent serving
as a conduit.  Agents also have incentive to manipulate the system
166. See Richard T. Karcher, Fundamental Fairness in Union Regulation of Sports
Agents, 40 CONN. L. REV. 355, 400 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1068801 (concluding that current appeals process
has agents “caught between a rock and a hard place”).
167. See Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. 504, 510-11
(2001) (citing Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)) (“But even ‘serious
error’ on the arbitrator’s part does not justify overturning his decision, where. . .he
is construing a contract and acting within the scope of his authority.”).
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in an attempt to gain affiliation with a high profile agency.  Minor
punishments are inconsequential if the individual has used unethi-
cal means to increase their status.  Likewise, agents may become
dispensable to large firms once the athletes have provided benefits
to the agency’s diversified businesses.  To mitigate both of these
concerns, corporate agencies could also be held liable by the board
for lack of agent oversight or conspiracy of conduct.
By holding firms responsible for the conduct of their employ-
ees, social pressure is exerted by co-workers to strengthen industry
norms and practices.  As a key component of self-regulation, peer
oversight can be a more effective deterrent than rules and regula-
tions.  The consequences for a firm failing to properly incentivize
employees are dramatic.  For example, sanctions on the firm
helped lead to the collapse of Arthur Andersen following their mal-
feasance in the Enron scandal.168  Having the option to impose this
type of penalty is crucial given the level of control and discretion
held by individuals within a firm.
An additional benefit to regulating sports agents is the in-
creased potential for innovation.  The lack of effective regulation
allows those in power to game the system towards their advantage,
stifling new ideas that might benefit clients.169  Enacting regulation
levels the playing field, provides opportunity for talented agents to
compete, and increases the chances for innovation within the
industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
As an emerging service industry, sport agency would benefit
from professionalization.  Self-regulation and governmental regula-
tions are often enacted in response to a negative image.170  In place
of the negative image, self-regulation demonstrates problem recog-
168. See CARY COGLIANESE, THOMAS J. HEALY, ELIZABETH K. KEATING &
MICHAEL L. MICHAEL, The Role of Government in Corporate Governance, REGULATORY
POLICY PROGRAM REPORT RPP-08 17-22 (2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.
edu/m-rcbg/research/rpp/reports/RPPREPORT8.pdf (identifying the role of
sanctions in collapse of Arthur Andersen).
169. See Gillian K. Hadfield. Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic
Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1728
(2008) (“So long as legal services are limited to conventional models of what it
means to solve a client’s legal problem, and the production of legal products is
limited to members of the profession (those in practice and those on the bench),
the ballooning complexity of law will remain largely uncontrolled”).
170. See Thomas R. Wotruba. Industry Self-Regulation: A Review and Extension to
a Global Setting, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 38, 41. (Spring 1997) (identifying “correc-
tion of some economic or marketplace inequality” as motivation for industry self-
regulation).
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nition and a proactive approach to creating solutions.  Rather than
numerous agents operating under differing standards, regulation
changes the dynamic to one where individuals are playing by the
same rules.  Most importantly, this proposal provides increased con-
fidence in the abilities of an agent and gives athletes knowledgeable
choices when making important decisions about agents.  Reducing
the levels of information asymmetry is a tangible benefit for athletes
and agents alike through greater transparency.  Micro-monitoring
of agents is impractical.  This proposal uses the structures created
by professional service firms to access the knowledge of industry
experts to influence behaviors, while utilizing the power of govern-
ment regulation to enforce the norms in order to restore public
confidence in the sport industry in the United States.
The enactment of this proposal is the beginning of the crea-
tion of a new legal and social structure that provides athletes with
greater assurance of competent representation and career advice.
It will also protect agents from having their clients raided by aggres-
sive recruiters.  By setting minimum standards for representation
and pursuing exploitative agents, this proposal creates a uniform
set of standards across sports that seek to protect players and
agents, while boosting public trust in sports.  Co-regulation allows
those closest to the industry to set the standards of conduct while
still providing the enforcement capabilities of government
regulation.
This proposal differs from the current structure and other pro-
posed solutions through the inclusion of a specific enforcement
mechanism and recognition of a similar industry structure as with
other professional services.  Sport agency consists of a combination
of law, marketing, negotiations, finance, and career advising.  Or-
ganizing and regulating the industry based on systems from these
fields, inclusive of industry-based and governmental enforcement
mechanisms are the next steps in professionalizing this fledgling
field.  By working with Congress to implement self-regulation, the
sport agent industry could eradicate problems that lead to exploita-
tion of athletes and loss of confidence in the sporting structures.
While this proposal is not naı¨ve enough to assume that incentives to
pay players or circumvent this system will be eliminated, it is a step
towards addressing the situation.  Through SPAAB, further changes
to the regulatory structure are likely needed to address weaknesses
or new challenges.
Commentators have used Sarbanes-Oxley as a model to eradi-
cate steroid usage of professional athletes and others have sug-
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gested that the UAAA and SPARTA be amended to improve
enforcement.171  Another commentator has suggested an oversight
commission to improve enforcement of UAAA and SPARTA.172
Our proposal differs as it is a broader approach to problems in the
sport industry and proposes that the SPAAB bring the weight and
power of the Federal government to bear on agent industry
problems.  The SPAAB provides a comprehensive solution to a long
festering problem that has harmed athletes and ethical agents.
171. See Sarah R. Heisler. Steroid Regulation in Professional Sports: Sarbanes-Oxley
as a Guide, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 201-202 (2009) (finding Sarbanes-
Oxley instructive on IPED usage reduction); see also Michael L. Martin, It’s Not Foul
Unless the Ref Blows the Whistle: How to step up enforcement of the UAAA and Sparta, 19
SPORTS LAW. J. 209, 210 (2012) (arguing that amendments are necessary for
enforcement).
172. See R. Alexander Payne, Rebuilding the Prevent Defense: Why Unethical Agents
Continue to Score and What Can Be Done to Change the Game, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 657, 684 (2011) (“Establishing the Sports Agent Licensing and Oversight Com-
mission (SALOC) by amending SPARTA, while leaving intact the current UAAA/
SPARTA agency contract form and disclosure requirements, would provide a cen-
tralized mechanism to (1) enforce the registration disclosure requirements of the
UAAA; (2) establish a single application process and fee; (3) monitor registered
agents; and (4) bring suits, both criminal and civil, against non-registered agents
who violate the law.”).
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